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The Policy Considerations of New Use Copyright 
Law as it Pertains to Ebooks* 
Joshua A. Tepfer** 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent decisions in the Southern District of New York 
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in favor of the 
defendant in the matter of Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta 
Books LLC1 brought the issue of online publication of books to 
the forefront of copyright law.  Although the Second Circuit 
affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against 
Rosetta’s publication of eight books for which Random House 
has the sole print2 copyright,3 the issue remains far from 
resolved. 
First, the court addressed the matter for purposes of 
granting or denying a preliminary injunction, but expressed no 
view as to what its ultimate holding would have been on the 
infringement issue of the case.4  Second, Random House only 

* This note is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** JD Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School.  I wish to thank 
the entire MIPR board and staff for all the help, and my mom, dad, sister, and 
grandma for their love and support. 
 1. 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002).  The litigation between Random House, 
Inc. and Rosetta Books, LLC provided the impetus for this article.  On 
December 4, 2002, the parties settled their dispute.  For detailed information 
on the settlement, see 
http://www.rosettabooks.com/pages/RB_RH_Release.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2003).  Despite this change in the status of the dispute, the principles 
delineated in this article remain the same. 
 2. Throughout this note, the word “print” is used to describe a traditional 
book on sheets of paper fastened or bound together within covers.  See 
Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (citing RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2001), 
available at http://www.allwords.com/8wlinks.php). 
 3. See Random House, 283 F.3d at 490. 
 4. In fact, the Second Circuit goes out of its way to point out that its 
decision in no way expresses a view on the likely outcome of the case.  It 
further states that Random House’s argument is indeed appealing.  See id. at 
491-92 (“To be sure, there is some appeal to appellant’s argument that an 
‘ebook’ – a digital book that can be read on a computer screen or electronic 
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reflects one district court’s analysis of the issue, and New York 
state contract law bound the court.5  Thus, if the issue arises in 
another district, and the applicable state contract law takes a 
more liberal approach to contract interpretation, the issue may 
be resolved differently.  Finally, the Copyright Act6 does not 
address this issue; therefore, until Congress directly addresses 
the issue of online book publishing, the issue will not 
adequately be resolved. 
In the meantime, book publishers and authors remain in 
the dark as to their rights to publish works online.  Not only 
does this create problems for already published books, but it 
also leaves the parties without much guidance in the creation 
of new book contracts.  This problem could result in contractual 
disputes that will hinder the development of new creative 
works.  If this result occurs, it would directly contradict the 
goals of copyright law — to promote the progress of creative 
works to benefit the public.7 
This note considers the policy issues behind granting the 
copyright of ebooks to the existing print book publisher instead 
of reverting these rights back to the author.  After determining 
that policy issues favor the publisher maintaining the copyright 
to ebooks, this note applies this rationale to the facts of 
Random House v. Rosetta Books.8  The policy rationale of this 
note does not determine how the court should have ruled in 
Random House, as New York state contract law bound that 

device – is simply a ‘form’ of a book, and therefore within the coverage of 
appellant’s licenses.” (internal citation omitted)).  The court makes its final 
holding “without expressing any view as to the ultimate merits of the 
case . . . .”  Id. at 492. 
 5. See Random House, 150 F.Supp.2d at 617-18. 
 6. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. (2001). 
 7. See U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that the purpose of patents 
and copyrights is  “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 
F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating “copyright protection is designed ‘To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ and the financial reward 
guaranteed to the copyright holder is but an incident of this general objective, 
rather than an end in itself”); West Publ’g. Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. 
Supp. 1571, 1582 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating the power granted to Congress by 
this clause “is a means by which an important public purpose may be 
achieved.  It is intended to motivate creative activity by the provision of a 
special reward, and eventually allows the public total access to the products of 
their genius [of authors] after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired”). 
 8. See 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (illustrating the facts 
of the case). 
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court.  However, where courts find ambiguity in contract 
language, copyright policy should be considered in the 
judgment and the principles discussed in this note should 
apply. 
Part I describes the historical development of new use case 
law.  Part II examines academic theory on new uses and 
examines the policy issues that serve as the backdrop for this 
issue.  Part III briefly details the history of books, which will 
prove essential in the policy analysis.  Part IV analyzes the 
background material in Parts I-III and concludes that the 
public policy concerns motivating copyright law are best served 
if the publisher of the print book maintains the copyright of the 
online publication of the same book. 
I. THE NEW USE CASE LAW 
The innovation of the online publication of books, creates a 
“new use” copyright issue.9  The term “new use” is used to 
connote the problem of new technologies creating an 
alternative way of using existing copyrighted works.10  This 
section examines the history and development of new use case 
law.  Although the courts began by construing grants of 
copyright to be broadly inclusive, a series of modern opinions 
limited the rights passed in these grants.  This section ends 
with an examination of the only case that has specifically 
addressed the ebook issue, Random House v. Rosetta Books.11 
The ability to convert digitized text into a format readable 
by computer software, and thus create an ebook, is just one of 
many instances of a technological advance affecting an existing 
copyright.  Until Random House, the courts had not addressed 
the specific ebook issue.  However, many other technological 
advances resulted in litigation over the right to license the new 

 9. See Random House, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (citing Boosey & Hawkes 
Music Publishers Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
These principles are in accord with the approach the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit uses in analyzing contractual language 
in disputes, such as this one, ‘about whether licensees may exploit 
licensed works through new marketing channels made possible by 
technologies developed after the licensing contract—often called “new 
use” problems.’ 
Id. 
 10. See Trotter Hardy, Copyright and “New-Use” Technologies, 23 NOVA L. 
REV. 659, 670 (1999) (giving an example of a new technology creating an 
alternative way of using existing copyrighted works). 
 11. 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y 2001). 
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use.  Some examples include talking motion pictures,12 
television,13 and home video cassettes and laser discs.14  The 
approaches that the courts have taken in these new use cases 
are discussed below. 
One of the first new use cases concerned the issue of 
whether “talkie” rights15 were included in a grant of silent 
motion picture rights.16  In Kirke La Shelle v. Armstrong, the 
Appellate Division reversed the trial court and, relying 
primarily on Frohman v. Fitch,17 held that even though “talkie” 
rights were not contemplated by the parties at the time the 
contract was created (because they did not exist and were not 
foreseeable), “it did not follow that the defendant could destroy 
the plaintiff’s property or diminish the value of what he 
purchased.”18  The court found that the refusal to include 
“talkie” rights would render the original grant useless.19  
Therefore, the grant should be read broadly20 to include those 
rights.21 
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.22 distinguishes itself 
from Kirke La Shelle Co.  Bartsch considered whether the 

 12. See Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E.2d 163 (1933). 
 13. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
 14. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Co., 
145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998); Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99 
(2d Cir. 1992); Bloom v. Hearst Entm’t, Inc., 33 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1994); Rey 
v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 15. The term “talkie” refers to the production of sound pictures.  See Kirke 
La Shelle Co., 188 N.E.2d at 164. 
 16. See id. at 165. 
 17. 149 N.Y.S. 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914). 
 18. Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E.2d at 167-68. 
 19. Id. at 168 
 20. Throughout this note, the terms “broad” and “narrow” are used to 
describe grants of copyright with regard to new uses.  A broad grant indicates 
a grant of copyright that would include the relevant new use, favoring the 
media provider.  A narrow grant indicates a limited grant that would not 
include a transfer of the relevant new use, favoring the author. 
 21. Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E.2d at 168.  Describing the relevant 
language in the grant, the court stated that the contract further provided that 
“all contract[s] affecting the title to the dramatic rights exclusive of motion 
picture rights or the production of the play in New York city, on the road, or in 
stock [should be subject to plaintiff’s] approval.” Id. at 166.  For a contrary 
interpretation of Kirke La Shelle Co., see Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Don’t Put My 
Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic 
Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 919 (1995). 
 22. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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copyright to motion pictures extended to television rights.23  In 
1935, the plaintiff, who was granted the motion picture rights 
to “Wie Einst in Mai” in 1930, transferred those rights to the 
defendant.24  When the defendant attempted to license the 
television rights, the controversy ensued.25  After reaffirming 
that state contract law applied,26 the court held that the 
copyright granted to the defendant was broad enough to 
include television rights.27  The court based its decision on two 
distinct factors.28  First, the court held that if the contract 
language is broad enough to cover the new use, the burden 
should fall on the grantor to limit the use.29  As this rationale 
only makes sense if the authors knew or should have known of 
the new use at the time the contract was created, the court held 
that television was a foreseeable new use.30 
The second rationale for favoring the broader view was the 
following: “it provides a single person who can make the 
copyrighted work available to the public over the penumbral 
medium, whereas the narrower one involves the risk that a 
deadlock between the grantor and the grantee might prevent 
the work’s being shown over the new medium at all.”31  In 
applying this rationale, the court’s underlying concern was the 
promotion of the goals of copyright law.32  The court expressed 
that these goals were best met by allowing a broad declaration 

 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 152. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 153. 
 27. See id. at 155. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 155 
As between an approach that ‘a license of rights in a given 
medium . . . includes only such uses as fall within the unambiguous 
core meaning of the term . . . and exclude any uses which lie within 
the ambiguous penumbra . . . and another [approach] whereby ‘the 
licensee may properly pursue any uses which may reasonably be said 
to fall within the medium as described in the license,’ [the latter 
approach should govern]. . . if Bartsch or his assignors had desired to 
limit ‘exhibition’ of the motion picture to the conventional method 
where light is carried from a projector to a screen directly beheld by 
the viewer, they could have said so. 
Id. 
 30. The trial court made the independent finding, with which the 
appellate court agreed, that in 1930, “the future possibilities of television were 
recognized by knowledgeable people in the entertainment and motion picture 
industries . . . .”  Id. at 154. 
 31. Id. at 155. 
 32. See id. 
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of rights.33 
Bartsch stands for the notion that grants of copyright 
should be interpreted broadly.34  The court based its decision on 
the rule of transfer of rights suggested by Professor Nimmer: 
when terms of the grant are ambiguous, “the licensee may 
properly pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall 
within the medium as described in the license.”35  However, 
Bartsch does not go as far as Kirke La Shelle because its 
holding is influenced by the fact that the television medium 
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the creation of the 
contract, whereas the holding in Kirke La Shelle was not. 
Two other significant cases continued the development of 
the new use case law.36  In Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
the Ninth Circuit held that the grant of television rights did not 
encompass videocassette rights.37  The court’s holding rested on 
three grounds.38  First, the grant in the contract indicated that 
the licensor transferred only a “limited right.”39  The court 
determined that the grant “must be tortured to expand the 
limited right granted . . . to an entirely different means of 

 33. See id. at 155; see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 34. The relevant language of the grant from Bartsch to Warner Bros. 
reads  “to copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture photoplays 
throughout the world, . . . .”  Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152. 
 35. MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
125.3 (1964). 
 36. See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 37. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 855. 
 38. Id. at 853-55. 
 39. See id. at 853.  In making this determination, the court distinguishes 
two cases outside the Ninth Circuit that held the grant of television rights 
encompasses the new use of videocassette.  See id. at 855 (describing Platinum 
Record Co., Inc. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983) and Rooney 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) aff’d, 714 
F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983)).  The court in 
Cohen concludes that the grants in both Platinum Record Co. and Rooney were 
extremely broad when compared to the grant in Cohen, as they used language 
such as the right to “exhibit, distribute, exploit, market and perform said 
motion picture, its air, screen and television trailers, perpetually throughout 
the world by any means or methods now or hereafter known” Cohen, 845 F.2d 
at 855 (citing Platinum Records, 566 F. Supp. at 227).  Further, in these cases, 
the court used language such as “the right to exhibit the films ‘by any present 
or future methods or means’, and by ‘any other means now known or 
unknown.’”  Id. (citing Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 223). 
On the other hand, the grant in Cohen reads as follows: “a synchronization 
license, which gave H & J the right to use the composition in a film called 
‘Medium Cool’ and to exhibit the film in theatres and on television.”  Id. at 
852.  (These rights were then transferred to Paramount.  Editor’s Note.) 
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making that film available to the general public – the 
distribution of individual videocassettes to the general public 
for private ‘performances’ in their homes.”40  Second, after 
determining that videocassettes for home viewing were not 
invented or known at the time of creation of the contract, the 
court concluded that if it allowed the licensee to have the 
copyright, the licensee would have received a windfall for 
something that was not bargained for in the initial agreement.41  
Finally, the court stated that its decision comports “with the 
purpose underlying federal copyright law.”42  The court 
concluded that it “would frustrate the purposes of the 
[Copyright] Act were we to construe this license – with its 
limiting language – as granting a right in a medium that had 
not been introduced to the domestic market at the time the 
parties entered into the agreement.”43 
Rey v. Lafferty concerned the same issue as Cohen: 
whether a grant of television rights included videocassette 
rights?44  The basis for the holding in Rey was extremely 
similar to that of Cohen.45  However, the court specifically 
advanced the new use issue by clearly delineating the two 
policy choices available “[w]here no reliable indicia of general 
intent are discernible.”46  The first choice, and preferred 
method, was that “the licensee may properly pursue any uses 
which may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as 
described in the license.”47  This choice is preferable when the 
new use was foreseeable at the time the contract was drafted.48  
The second option was a narrow reading that presumes the 
grant only included the license right to the one expressly 
indicated medium.49  Rey stated that this choice was 

 40. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853. 
 41. See id. at 854. (referring to this reason as “[p]erhaps the primary 
reason why . . . the license cannot be construed as including the distribution of 
videocassettes for home viewing . . . .”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 854. 
 44. See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993).  The relevant 
phrase of the grant discussed in Rey is part of the revised agreement that 
“licensed LHP [Defendant] to produce the 104 episodes ‘for television viewing.’”  
Id. at 1387. 
 45. See id. at 1389-1391. 
 46. Id. at 1388. 
 47. Id. (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT 125.3 (1964)) 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
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particularly appropriate when there may be a situation of 
unequal bargaining power or the new use “was completely 
unforeseeable . . . at the time of the original grant.”50 
In sum, Cohen and Rey aided the interpretation of new use 
case law by standing for the rule that without the express 
indication of a broad grant of rights, the copyright for the new 
use should default back to the grantor.51  In this respect, these 
decisions favored the grantor by taking a narrower approach 
than Bartsch.  Although Bartsch did not give the grantee carte 
blanche rights, it still seemed to favor the grantee in cases of 
ambiguity.52  Of course, neither Cohen nor Rey overruled 
Bartsch as the cases were in separate circuits. 
Another important new use case was Boosey & Hawkes 
Music Publishers, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Co.53  In Boosey & 
Hawkes, composer Igor Stravinsky sold his rights to the 
composition “The Rite of Spring” to Disney in 1939 for use in its 
motion picture Fantasia.54  Since 1940, Fantasia had been re-
released, without any objection, in theatrical distribution at 
least seven times with the use of “The Rite of Spring.”55  
However, in 1991 Fantasia was released in video format, 
generating more than $360 million in gross revenue for 
Disney.56  Boosey & Hawkes, now the copyright holder of “The 
Rite of Spring,” objected to the use of the work in this new 
form.57 
On the one hand, Boosey & Hawkes affirmed Bartsch in 
that it held the grant in the license to be broad enough to 
include the new use of video format rights.58  However, the 

 50. Id. 
 51. See id.; see also Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
 52. See Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690, 695 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 53. 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 54. See id. at 484.  The relevant grant language in Boosey & Hawkes is as 
follows: “the nonexclusive, irrevocable right, license, privilege and authority to 
record in any manner, medium or form, and to license the performance of, the 
musical composition hereinbelow set out [The Rites of Spring].”  Id.  
Additionally, the grant stated, “[t]he music of said musical composition may be 
used in one motion picture . . . .”  Id.  The grant also specified, “the licensor 
reserves to himself all rights and uses in and to the said musical composition 
not herein specifically granted.”  Id. 
 55. See id. at 485. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 486. 
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dicta in Boosey & Hawkes suggested that the court did not 
favor this approach, but rather based its decision solely on the 
contract language.59  Boosey & Hawkes demonstrates no 
preference for the licensor or licensee holding the new use 
right.60  In this regard, it is a narrowing of the law of Bartsch.61 
Although the cases analyzed above do not include every 
new use decision, they highlight a general modern trend 
toward limited new use rights to the licensee.  With these cases 
and trends as the backdrop, Random House v. Rosetta Books 
was the first court to address the copyright issues of print 
books online.62 
The Random House case concerned eight books from three 
different authors.63  Although each contract between the author 
and Random House differed somewhat, the relevant grant 
language for each contract was the same: “to print, publish and 
sell the work in book form.”64  Some of the contracts also 
contained non-compete clauses65 and provisions granting 
Random House the right to “Xerox and other forms of copying 
of the printed page, either now in use or hereafter developed.”66 
In the year 2000, Rosetta Books contracted with the three 
authors67 to publish the eight books in digital format over the 

 59. See id. at 487. 
In our view, new-use analysis should rely on neutral principles of 
contract interpretation rather than solicitude for either party.  
Although Bartsch speaks of placing the ‘burden of framing and 
negotiating an exception . . . on the grantor’ Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155, 
it should not be understood to adopt a default rule in favor of 
copyright licensees or any default rule whatsoever.  What governs 
under Bartsch is the language of the contract.  If the contract is more 
reasonably read to convey one meaning, the party benefited by that 
reading should be able to rely on it; the party seeking exception or 
deviation from the meaning reasonably conveyed by the words of the 
contract should bear the burden of negotiating for language that 
would express the limitation or deviation.  This principle favors 
neither licensors nor licensees.  It follows simply from the words of 
the contract. 
Id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150; see also 
supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 62. 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 63. See id at 614.  The authors were William Styron, Kurt Vonnegut, and 
Robert Parker. 
 64. Id. at 620. 
 65. See id. at 616-617. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 614. 
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Internet.68  Rosetta’s ebooks included “a book cover, title page, 
copyright page and [an] ‘eforward’ all created by Rosetta 
Books.”69  The text of the ebook is exactly the same as the print 
book, but does contain additional features, including an ability 
(1) to search the work electronically for specific words or 
phrases;70 (2) to “electronically ‘highlight’ and ‘bookmark’ 
certain text, which can then be automatically indexed and 
accessed through hyperlinks;”71 (3) to type electronic notes and 
store, index, sort, and file these notes;72 (4) to alter the font size 
and style of the text;73 and (5) to display the definition of any 
word in the text.74  Some versions of the software also feature a 
voice activation system that will pronounce any word out loud.75 
The court held that the grant language did not include the 
exclusive copyright to the ebook.76  The court based its holding 
on the use of the term “in book form” in the contract, which it 
viewed as a more limited grant than the use of the term 
“work.”77 
The court also denied Random House’s argument that the 
phrase; “to ‘publish the work at its own expense and in such a 
style and manner and at such a price as [Random House] 
deems suitable’”78, which was located in some of the grants, 
conferred a broad right to them.79  The court further rejected 
Random House’s argument that the non-compete clauses in 
several of the contracts made a broad reading of the grant more 
reasonable.80  Finally, the court held that the clause granting 

 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 615. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. at 620. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id (“In context, the phrase simply means that Random House has 
control over the appearance of the formats granted to Random House in the 
first paragraph; i.e., control over the style of the book.”).  The court also bases 
its determination on its knowledge of industry custom.  See id. at 621.  “[A] 
reasonable person ‘cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology 
as generally understood in the particular trade or business would conclude 
that the grant language does not include ebooks.’”  Id (citing Sayers v. 
Rochester Telephone Corp., 7 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 80. See id. at 621.  “First, the grant of rights follows from the grant 
language alone.”  Id. (citing Boosey & Hawkes Music Publisher Ltd. v. The 
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Random House the right to “Xerox and other forms of copying, 
either now in use or hereafter developed”81 did not transfer the 
ebook right.82 
The court focused on four differences in distinguishing 
Random House from Bartsch and Boosey & Hawkes.  First, the 
court held that the language conveying the rights in Bartsch 
and Boosey & Hawkes was much broader.83  Second, the court 
highlighted the substantial difference in the medium of ebooks 
and print books when contrasted with the comparatively 
similar mediums at issue in Bartsch and Boosey & Hawkes 
(display of a motion picture on television or videocassette).84  
Third, the court stated that since Bartsch and Boosey & 
Hawkes actually display a new work rather than a simple 
transfer of the author’s work, as in Random House, the 
copyright issues should be treated distinctly.85  Finally, the 
court determined that the policy concerns that influenced 
Bartsch and Boosey & Hawkes were not relevant here.86 
The court in Random House is consistent with the trend 
toward construing grants more narrowly in that it ruled that 
the author maintains the right to the ebook.  Part II examines 
the scholarly work in the new use area.  Some of this work 
seems to favor this limiting trend, while other work views this 
trend as contrary to the goals of copyright law. 

Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 1998).  “Second, non-compete 
clauses must be limited in scope in order to be enforceable in New York.”  Id 
(citing  American Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 403-04, 420 (1981). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id.  This grant: 
clearly refers only to new developments in xerography and other 
forms of photocopying.  Stretching it to include new forms of 
publishing, such as ebooks, would make the rest of the contract 
superfluous because there would be no reason for authors to 
reserve rights to forms of publishing ‘now in use.’ 
Id. 
 83. See id. at 622.  Cf. the grant in Bartsch supra note 34 and the grant in 
Boosey & Hawke supra note 54. 
 84. See id. at 622-23. 
 85. See id. at 623. 
 86. See id. 
[T]he policy rationale of encouraging development in new 
technology is at least as well served by finding that the 
licensors—i.e., the authors—retain these rights to their works. In 
the 21st century, it cannot be said that licensees such as book 
publishers and movie producers are ipso facto more likely to 
make advances in digital technology than start-up companies. 
Id. 
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II. THEORIES ON NEW USE LAW: AN “ALL THINGS 
BEING EQUAL” ANALYSIS 
Jonathan Tasini, President of the National Writers Union, 
encapsulated the feeling of creative authors when he compared 
the plight of freelance writers to that of sweatshop workers.87  
These authors believe that “they are entitled to the rights to 
their works on new media, which would enable them to license 
the works to the original publisher, if they choose, for 
reissuance on the electronic media.”88 
On the other hand, the argument of the old use copyright 
holder is strong.  These businesses negotiated a contract 
believing they owned the right to the work in all of its forms.  If 
it is ruled that they do not own the new use right, a very real 
fear that the new use will eventually come to replace the old 
use exists, and the business will be left selling a product that 
nobody uses anymore.89  At the same time, publishers argue 
that since any publication of the work in new use form only 
serves to advertise the old use, the author suffers no harm.90 
Casting a shadow over the whole argument is the United 
States Constitution, which gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”91  In determining 

 87. See Mary Voboril, Writes and Wrongs: Freelancers Are Struggling 
against Low Pay, Deadbeat Publishers and Ownership of Electric Rights, 
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 21, 1994, (quoting Jonathan Tasini, president of the 
National Writers Union), available at 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/newsday/doc/6480488.html?MAC=8213ald37ca67
25abb096. 
 88. Rosenzweig, supra note 21, at 908.  Of course, if they retained the 
rights, it would also give authors the opportunity to sell the new use rights to 
a third party, as William Styron, Kurt Vonnegut, and Robert B. Parker did to 
Rosetta Books, causing the Random House litigation.  Random House, Inc. v. 
Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 89. See e.g., Trotter Hardy, Copyright and New-Use Technologies, 23 
NOVA L. REV. 659, 673 (1999) (describing White Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 
209 U.S. 1 (1908) and its aftermath). 
History now shows us that notwithstanding the vigorous discussion at 
the hearings about how recorded music would boost the sale of sheet 
music, the sheet music market soon withered under the dual 
onslaught of the phonograph and later the radio.  Today, music in the 
home almost invariably means radio or recorded music, the income 
from which easily dwarfs that of sheet music sales. 
Id. at 677-78. 
 90. See Hardy, supra note 89, at 673-78. 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
 2003] EBOOKS 405 
 
whether or not the author transferred her exclusive right, 
parties are left to question whether the articulated 
constitutional purpose – to promote the progress of Science and 
useful Arts – is best realized by granting either limited or 
broad new use rights to the licensee.92 
In a theoretical vacuum of “all things being equal,”93 this 
section presents the relevant academic arguments that tend to 
support giving either the grantor or the grantee licensing rights 
to the new use.  Four recent academic works, published in 
various law journals, are examined.  The first and second 
articles discussed favor a narrow grant of new use rights 
favored by the modern courts.94  The third and fourth articles 
support the broader grant of new use rights described in Part 
I.95 
A. NARROW GRANT THEORIES 
Scholar Trotter Hardy takes an interesting approach to the 
issue as it pertains to royalties for new uses.96  Hardy considers 
whether or not the owner of a copyright should receive royalties 
from the sales of her work in new use form.97  Hardy analyzes 
this issue by considering which decision – to receive royalties or 
not – would result in greater disincentives to the author to 
create new works.98  However, Hardy contends that it is 
impossible to make this conclusion without knowing whether or 
not the new use is likely to replace the old use.99  If the new use 

 92. Two distinct policy considerations should be included under the idea of 
promoting the arts: “the benefits of giving new technologies ‘room to grow’ by 
not encumbering them with full copyright liability; and the benefits of 
ensuring that as a technology grows to become economically significant, those 
who create works of authorship for it will have an adequate incentive to 
continue their creative efforts.”  Hardy, supra note 89, at 688. 
 93. By “all things being equal”, this section does not consider the 
foreseeability of the new use nor the relevant grant language. 
 94. See supra Part I. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See Hardy, supra note 89. 
 97. See id. at 672-704.  This issue is slightly distinct from the question in 
Random House because the authors in Random House are arguing that they 
retained the full copyright.  Thus, they have the right to do with the online 
publishing rights what they choose. 
On the other hand, Hardy’s article seems to assume that the new use right has 
been transferred.  However, it questions whether, despite the grant, authors 
should receive additional compensation based on sales of the product from the 
new use. 
 98. See id. at 695-704. 
 99. See id. at 692-93. 
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industry will replace the old use, incentives, in the form of 
royalties to authors, are needed.100  If not, no such incentives 
are needed.101 
Of course, as noted above, there is no way to know whether 
or not the new use will displace the old use.102  The best we can 
do is guess.  “All things being equal,” Hardy determines that 
two types of errors could occur: (1) the decision that “the new-
use is an infringement, and consequently that the copyright 
owner has a right to demand royalties, even though it will 
eventually prove to be the case that the new-use industry does 
not become a significant market for copyright owners”103 or (2) 
“that a decision is made that the new-use is not an 
infringement, even though the industry is destined to become 
potentially a major source of income to copyright owners.”104  Of 
these two errors, Hardy determines that the greater and more 
likely harm occurs with the second error.105  Therefore, Hardy 

 100. See id.  This conclusion is based on the idea that if new uses regularly 
displace old uses, authors will have no incentive to create products for the new 
use.  If they only receive royalties from the old use, and the old use no longer 
has a viable market, there will be no incentives for the author to continue to 
create, as all the sales are coming from the new use, for which they receive no 
compensation.  If new uses frequently replace old uses and there are no 
incentives to create, it is a failure in promotion of the arts. 
 101. See id. at 693.  The basis for this theoretical holding is that if the new 
use does not displace the old use, it will only serve as an advertising 
mechanism for the old use.  In this regard, it will only boost the sales of the old 
use.  Thus, the creation of the new use provides no disincentives to create new 
works.  In fact, it likely creates incentives.  See id. at 692. 
However, it could be argued that if the new use only serves as an advertising 
mechanism for the old use, then there will be no incentives for the continued 
advancement of technology.  That is, the new use, probably expensive to 
create, will not be making its own money.  Therefore, unless it significantly 
aids the sales of the old use, media creators will have a disincentive to expand 
on the new use; thus, it is a failure in the promotion of science. 
 102. See id. at 693. 
 103. Id. at 694. 
 104. Id. at 695.  Note that the other two possibilities – that the author 
receives royalties and the market is a success or the author does not receive 
royalties but there is no damage to his sales of the old use – are not errors 
because they do not provide economic disincentives to the author.  These 
results would not affect the author’s economic motivation to produce product. 
 105. Two harms occur in the first error. 
First is that a requirement to make royalty payments may be enough 
to stifle the new-use industry, leaving it to founder [sic] when it might 
have survived, or perhaps leaving it weakened, amounting to less 
than it might have amounted. . .  Perhaps worse, a second type of 
harm . . . would arise if copyright owners were content with their own 
system of exploiting copyrighted works and simply did not want any 
competition from new uses.  They might therefore deny a license to 
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concludes that, “all things being equal,” we should construe the 
author to have the new use rights so as to avoid the greater 
harm of guessing wrong.106 
Gayley Rosen also argues for the narrow approach.107  
“Courts must recognize that a copyright owner has a legitimate 
interest in protecting his or her work and in profiting from the 
exploitation of his or her work.”108  Although the public may 
have an interest in receiving media in new and more advanced 
forms, one may also consider the following: 
allowing the public’s interest to outweigh the original copyright 
holders’ interests by granting all rights to the grantee would not 
benefit the public.  Contrarily, it would cause copyright holders to be 
reluctant to ever give up or transfer the rights to their works for fear 
that they will lose all control and right to profit.
109
 
For these reasons, this approach is consistent with that of 
the Ninth Circuit and, “all things being equal,” would construe 
a grant to the licensee narrowly. 
B. BROAD GRANT THEORIES 
Sidney A. Rosenzweig argues for a broad interpretation of 
grants that give licensees new use rights:110  “vesting ownership 
in publishers and other licensees . . . results in smaller 
transaction costs and facilitates the wider dissemination of 
information necessary for the development of new media.”111  
The broader grant better facilitates wider dissemination 
because “the existing media producers are likely in a better 
position to exploit or develop new media with smaller 
transactions costs . . . .  In the mass-media industry, this 
synergy is particularly evident because of the concentration of 

the new industry even if the industry were willing and could afford to 
pay a suitable royalty. 
See id. at 694. 
The harm from the second error is “[m]ost obviously, . . .  the lack of royalties 
from the new industry will mean a significant disincentive for authors as the 
old royalty paying industry gradually shrinks in importance.  In that event, 
the public will lose the benefit of whatever a greater incentive might have 
brought.”  Id. at 695. 
 106. Id. at 703. 
 107. Gayley Rosen, Comment, The Rights To Future Technologies: Should 
Bourne v. Disney Change the Rules? 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617 (1997). 
 108. Id. at 631. 
 109. Id. at 631-32. 
 110. See Rosenzweig, supra note 21, at 920. 
 111. Id. 
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media power.”112 
The alternative – authors retaining the rights – is 
economically more burdensome.113  Authors would be forced to 
negotiate with producers or publishers in order to get their 
work on the new media.114  This extra negotiation could inhibit 
production.115  Therefore, the broad grant is more economically 
efficient.116 
Moreover, Rosenzweig argues that a broad grant “does not 
work as a disincentive to authorship.”117  Since the new use, by 
definition, is not in the contemplation of the parties, “it does 
not frustrate expectations.”118  Additionally, future parties can 
still bargain as to new uses, with authors maintaining the 
rights if they pay due consideration.119 
Caryn J. Adams, in her analysis of Random House v. 
Rosetta Books, supports Rosenzweig’s argument.120  Adams 
finds the court’s grounds for distinguishing Random House 
from the broad grant precedent of Bartsch unpersuasive.121  
First, Adams takes a more liberal approach and construes the 
grant language in Random House more broadly than the court 
does.122  Second, Adams takes issue with the court’s focus on 
whether or not the new work is distinct from the original.123  

 112. Id. at 923. 
 113. See id. at 922. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 920. 
 118. Id. at 925. 
 119. See id. at 925. 
 120. See Caryn J. Adams, Case Comment, Random House v. Rosetta Books, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 29 (2002). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. at 44-45.  “Given the functional and conceptual similarities 
between digital and paper books, . . . a court interpreting the phrase ‘in book 
form’ could reasonably include eBooks within the ambit of the contracts’ 
language.”  Id.  Moreover, “the broad interpretation should depend not on 
formal distinctions such as whether print books and eBooks belong to the 
same medium, but rather on their functions and the ways in which the readers 
experience the works.”  Id. at 45.  The question should be “whether the 
‘fundamental characteristic’ of the intellectual property involved . . . remains 
unaltered . . . .  If so, ‘the physical form in which the work is fixed . . . is 
irrelevant.’” Id. (citing Random House Reply Brief at 4, Random House (No. 
01-1728), available at 
http://www.rosettabooks.com/casedocs/Random_House_Reply_Brief.pdf (Feb. 
11, 2002)). 
 123. See id. at 45. 
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Adams argues that the court’s approach is counter-intuitive: “It 
seems more logical that the closer the new use is in form to the 
original use, the more likely it will be that the contract 
language will be broad enough to cover the new use.”124  Finally, 
Adams argues that allowing Random House to have the ebook 
rights “does not . . . inherently hinder the progression of 
technological development.”125  If ebooks become popular, 
current publishers will no doubt take part in the new 
technology.126  Plus, nothing can stop an ebook publisher from 
signing contracts for new works.127 
C. SUMMARY OF THEORIES 
In sum, there are significant differences in opinion 
regarding the best policy for new use law.  Hardy argued that, 
in the case of ambiguity, grants should be construed narrowly 
because the potential error from a narrow grant is less harmful 
than the potential error from a broad grant.128  Rosen agreed 
that grants should be construed narrowly but based his 
rationale on the proposition that the author’s interest 
outweighs the public’s interest.129 
Others believe ambiguous grants should be construed 
broadly whenever possible.  Rosenzweig uses a purely economic 
rationale in making his conclusion.130  Adams focuses on the 
fact that the new use in Random House hardly changes the 
work’s form, so it is reasonable to conclude that the grant 
included the new use.131 
The question remains as to whether a broad grant of rights 
to traditional book publishers is appropriate for the rights to 
publish ebooks.  Is there something distinct about traditional 
print books, as opposed to the other old uses, that lends clarity 
to this specific issue?  Part III briefly analyzes the history of 
print books in order to determine whether or not there is a 
distinction to the medium of books. 

 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 46. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 120-127 and accompanying text. 
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III.A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRINT BOOKS 
Although there are differences in opinion whether the 
writing on stones, wood, and metal in ancient Mesopotamia 
constituted books, the book rolls created in ancient Egypt, 
Greece, and Rome do fall under the definition of a book.132  
“These rolls were universally accepted vehicles for 
communication of permanent value.”133  The best known of 
these rolls were the books of the dead of ancient Egypt, 
“prepared as burial gifts for departing souls to guide them on 
their journey to the other world and to brief them for the 
judgment that awaited them.”134  These books had labeling 
devices called titulus, modernly referred to as a title.135  They 
also often had the author’s portrait on the first page, which 
previewed the idea of a title page developed about 2,000 years 
later.136 
The book trade of Rome previewed post-medieval book 
publishing.137  The Romans manufactured papyrus rolls and 
multiplied the content “by dictation or copying from carefully 
prepared master copies.”138 
The creation of books continued to develop in order to make 
them functionally easier.139  This development corresponded 
with the increasing popularity of their use, especially by the 
Christian liturgy and in legal practice.140  The shift in function 
was most apparent from the 13th century onward.141  “A new 
interest in science and philosophy, the rise of modern 
languages and literatures, the new flowering of chivalrous 
poetry, the beginnings of humanistic studies and of popular 
education, both religious and secular – all these factors 
quickened the pulse of medieval book production.”142  After 
these developments, the invention of printing from movable 
metal type occurred.143  This invention enabled the book “to 

 132. See 4 HELMUTT LEHMANN-HAUPT, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 
INTERNATIONAL EDITION 220 (Americana Corp. 1974) (1829). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 221. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. at 225. 
 142. Id. at 225. 
 143. See id. 
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maintain its central position in the transmission of culture . . . 
[and] to assume important new responsibilities in five centuries 
of scientific discovery and technological progress, during social 
developments of crucial importance, and in rapidly expanding 
areas of communication.”144  The industrialization of printing in 
the 19th century continued the development and had almost as 
profound an effect on books as the invention of printing itself.145  
This industrialization was when book publishing developed into 
the mass production media market it is today.146  Books were 
mass-produced for an ever-widening market.147  The market 
continued to expand, and today, books of some type are a staple 
of almost every household throughout the world. 
IV.ANALYSIS 
This section examines the case law and academic theory 
and proposes that, all things being equal, a narrow view of the 
grant is, in general, the best approach to take to new uses.  
Despite this argument, Sections B and C explain why the issue 
in Random House – namely, the rights to publish online – 
should be an exception to this general rule.  Therefore, this 
note argues that in the case of an ambiguous grant, copyright 
policy favors the publisher retaining the right to the ebook.  
Section D applies this theory to the facts of the Random House 
case. 
A. NARROW GRANTS ARE MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC 
POLICY CONCERNS OF COPYRIGHT LAW THAN BROADER 
GRANTS 
Recently, technological advances seem to occur shockingly 
quickly.148  Overlap within the world of media – or what the 
industry calls “convergence” – continues to expand.149  “Video, 

 144. Id. at 226. 
 145. See id. at 229. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Technological Advances of the 20th Century at 
http://www.temprupedic.com/timeline.asp (last visited Feb., 25 2003) 
[hereinafter Technological Advances of the 20th Century].  See also Alexis 
Weedon and Julia Knight, Convergence, 1 THE JOURNAL OF RESEARCH INTO 
NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES (Spring 1995), available at 
http://www.luton.ac.uk/convergence/volumeone/numberone/editorial.shtml. 
 149. See Weedon and Knight, supra note 148, at ¶1, (“Trying to summarise 
[sic] the significant developments that are taking place in broadcasting, 
multimedia, programme-making, virtual reality, entertainment and 
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audio, and text have become computer applications and are 
combining in ways never possible before.”150  Movies are not 
only shown on videocassettes and television, but can now be 
downloaded straight to a computer from a Web site or DVD.151  
Some have argued that eventually computers and television 
will converge so that one product will serve both functions.152 
Music is more easily accessible than ever.  Web sites allow 
one to download almost any song onto a computer 
permanently.153  There are Web sites that allow one to listen to 
any radio station in any city from anywhere in the country.154  

telecommunications and to pull out pertinent issues is a daunting task, but in 
any discussion of these areas one theme constantly and consistently reoccurs, 
and that is ‘convergence.’”). 
 150. What is new media?, Indiana University School of Informatics, New 
Media at http://www.newmedia.iupui.edu/get.php?s=whatis (last visited Feb. 
14, 2003). 
 151. See, e.g., MP3Ucom, available http://www.mp3u.com (last visited Feb. 
14, 2003) (website allows users to download movies, songs, and MP3s). 
 152. See Debate: Will Web and Television Converge? at 
http://graphics.stanford.edu/~bjohanso/cs448/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2003) 
It is easiest to first answer the question of whether a computer will be 
able to receive television content.  The types of content that are 
broadcast over television currently, and will continue to be broadcast 
if the two media do not converge, are audio/video streams.  Since the 
computer media already includes audio and video streams, it should 
be able to decode the streams with no extra equipment. . . .  So, a 
computer will be able to receive television content for little extra cost.  
Since the cost difference between a machine with this capability and a 
machine without this capability will be low, even if there is little 
consumer interest in this, machines will still come with this 
capability. 
The more difficult question is whether a television will be able to 
display world wide web content.  It is pretty clear that you can put 
enough hardware into a television to make it able to display the 
media that a computer can display.  Essentially you would need to 
add a reasonable sized hard disk, some memory, and a fairly fast 
general purpose processor.  How much would this add to the cost of 
the television? . . . 
The question to answer now is whether the average consumer would 
be willing to pay $50 extra for this functionality.  If so, then 
broadcasters would be likely to merge the content, and manufacturers 
to include the extra functionality. 
Id.  See also Stefanie Olsen and Joe Wilcox, Microsoft Unveils Windows Media 
9, CNETASIA available at 
http://asia.cnet.com/newstech/personaltech/0,39001147,39079103,00.htm 
(Sept. 5, 2002) (“For consumer media playing, the system is updated for speed 
and seamless playback to create a more TV-like experience on the PC.”). 
 153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 154. See, e.g., Radiolocator, available at http://www.radio-locator.com (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2003) (claiming to be “the most comprehensive radio search 
engine on the internet.”). 
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There are live performances on the Internet,155 books published 
solely on the Web,156 and online versions of most major 
newspapers.157 
With all this overlap, distinguishing the different mediums 
from each other becomes more and more difficult.  For example, 
if televisions and computers really converge, there is no way to 
distinguish between the two mediums.158  With all signs 
pointing toward convergence and technological innovations 
continuing to grow, the problem of distinguishing between the 
mediums will be exacerbated. 
As convergence continues to grow, Bartsch’s broad grant of 
rights to any medium that reasonably falls in the penumbra 
becomes unwieldy.159  As convergence grows, the penumbra 
becomes larger and larger.  Under Bartsch, a singular grant in 
the modern world could encompass all forms of media.160  
Simply put, convergence in the world of media makes the 
holding in Bartsch – thirty-five years old this year – outdated.161 
One could argue that grantors should simply be more 
careful when they create contracts.  First, they should make 
efforts not to use ambiguous contract language as it relates to 
new uses.  Second, even if ambiguity cannot be avoided, 
authors should be careful to examine any potential new uses on 
the horizon.  After all, as explained in Part I, Bartsch limited 
its holding to new media that was foreseeable at the time of the 
creation of the contract.162 
However, these arguments lose steam when one actually 
considers how quickly technological innovations are 
occurring.163  In reality, the issue of foreseeability is a non-

 155. See, e.g., Mediachannel, available at 
http://www.mediachannel.com/guides/live.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2003) 
(listing what live performances are on the Internet everyday). 
 156. See, e.g., M.J. Rose, Stephen King’s ‘Plant’ Uprooted, available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,40356,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2003) (discussing Stephen King’s foray into online publishing with “The 
Plant”, a seven part series published in installments only on the Internet). 
 157. See, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (online 
version of the New York Times). 
 158. See Weedon and Knight, supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 
1968). 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. at 150. 
 162. See id. at 155; see supra Part I. 
 163. See Technological Advances of the 20th Century, supra note 148 and 
accompanying text. 
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issue.  At this point in the world of media, everything is 
foreseeable; nothing is too hard to imagine anymore.  Precisely 
because everything is foreseeable, predicting which new use 
will successfully overtake the old use becomes exceedingly more 
difficult.  Even if it is possible to accurately predict that a new 
use will overtake the existing use, the speed and 
unpredictability of the market make it impossible to say that 
this new use will not soon be overtaken by an even newer 
use.164 
To better illustrate the problems with a broad grant, it is 
best to examine the issue in two distinct scenarios.  First, the 
problem can be seen in works that are already published, like 
those at issue in Random House.165  Due to the modern 
convergence of mediums, a broad grant of rights for any media 
in the broad penumbra would create a huge windfall for the 
media provider.166  The grantee would receive a tremendous 
amount of rights for mediums not bargained for in the original 
contract.167  This is, on its face, unfair.  More to the point, it will 
eventually work against promoting the arts as authors will not 
be compensated adequately and thus will not have incentives to 
continue creating. 
Another problem with a broad grant of rights can be seen 
in the creation of new works and contracting for these rights.  
With the ability of foreseeing practically any new use168 – but 
the impossibility of foreseeing which, if any, of these new use 
technologies will succeed in overtaking the existing use – it 
becomes increasingly difficult to create fair contracts.  If 
authors are going to contract for a broad grant to the licensee, 
they will want exceedingly high royalties.169  Media providers 
will be wary of doing this, especially for unproven authors.  
This may go against one of the goals of copyright law, which is 

 164. See id. 
 165. See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books, LLC., 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 
614 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (the books were already published and Rosetta wanted to 
put them into digital or electronic form). 
 166. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see supra text accompanying note 29; see 
Weedon & Knight, note 148.  As stated above, convergence makes the 
penumbra exceptionally broad and, thus, makes Bartsch’s penumbra rule 
outdated. 
 167. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155. 
 168. See Technological Advances of the 20th Century, supra note 148 and 
accompanying text; see Weedon & White, supra note 148. 
 169. See Hardy, supra note 89, at 692-693. 
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to promote useful art.170 
In the alternative, authors will demand that grants be 
explicitly and unambiguously limited to one medium.  
Notwithstanding the feasibility of achieving this, which is 
arguable because of convergence,171 it creates problems in the 
promotion of science.  Media providers will lose incentive to 
improve on their own technology if they know that by creating 
new mediums they may take themselves out of the game – i.e., 
lose their copyright of the products they bought with a limited 
grant.172   
Finally, the fact that media companies are in a superior 
bargaining position is an additional reason to favor the 
grantors in the case of ambiguity.  These companies usually 
write the contracts; therefore, in the case of ambiguity, basic 
contract theory demands that their writing be construed 
against them.173 
Of course, as much of the earlier case law and counter 
academic material demonstrate,174 there are viable arguments 
for a broader interpretation of the grant.  However, upon close 
examination of these arguments, they can be rebutted. 
First, the argument stating that a narrow grant limits the 
promotion of science in that publishers will not pursue 
improvements in technology if their grants are limited holds 
less sway in the modern world.175  As the district court stated in 
Random House, “[i]n the 21st century, it cannot be said that 
licensees such as book publishers and movie producers are ipso 
facto more likely to make advances in digital technology than 
start-up companies.”176  Therefore, even if large media providers 

 170. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 171. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  If a grant were limited to 
television for example, would the example in note 152 unambiguously apply?  
Convergence may be inextricably linked to ambiguity. 
 172. Common sense tells us that a for-profit media company will not 
pursue advances in technology if those advances will negatively affect their 
profits. 
 173. See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding 
that the party that drafted the contract was more experienced and had the 
advantage of drafting it in his favor). 
 174. See supra Part I and Part II. 
 175. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 176. Random House Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F.Supp.2d 613, 623 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Of course, this conclusion does not counter the problem that 
the narrower grant serves as a disincentive to the creation of new technology 
for the publisher.  However, the fact that new technologies come from a 
variety of sources somewhat lessens the strength of this argument. 
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do not have the incentive to continue searching for 
technological advances, other smaller companies certainly will.  
Thus, there is less danger that a narrow grant will limit 
technological advances. 
Second, the economic rationale – that there are higher 
transaction costs associated with a narrow grant as opposed to 
a broad grant – is not of much concern.177  Because of the high 
competition in the media market, it should not be difficult for a 
successful author to find a new use outlet for her product.  
Therefore, in reality, a narrow grant will not result in 
significantly more transaction costs than a broad grant. 
Third, the broad grant argument – that if the new use will 
help sales, the current media provider will no doubt take part 
in the new technology – is misguided.178  Even if this argument 
is correct, and the media provider does partake in the new use, 
the allocation of resources to this new technology will limit the 
resources available to invest in other new products.  With fewer 
resources to invest in the new product, the public may have less 
access to literature that the publisher feels is profitable or 
useful; in this respect, this point may still hinder an aspect of 
copyright’s constitutionally stated purpose.179 
For the above reasons, policy considerations generally 
favor construing ambiguous grants narrowly so that authors 
retain the right to new uses of their product.  However, this 
conclusion does not end the discussion.  This note seeks to 
answer another, more limited question: whether a book 
publisher should have the rights to publish their existing book 
contracts online or whether the rights to the work should revert 
back to the author?  The above theorizes that if one applies 
traditional new use principles to this question, policy 
considerations favor the rights reverting back to the author.  
However, for the issue of books, the question should be 
examined more closely.  Sections B and C do so. 
B. BOOKS AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE NARROW GRANT POLICY 
Part III, “A Brief History of Print Books,” demonstrates 
that books are different from the other new mediums that have 
recently been created.180  The primary difference is that books 

 177. Rosenzweig, supra note 21, at 920; see supra note 111 and 
accompanying text. 
 178. See Adams, supra note 120, at 46. 
 179. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra Part III. 
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are so embedded in the world’s culture that they are in no 
danger of disappearing.181  The section on books in the 
Encyclopedia Americana, written by Hellmut Lehmann-Haupt, 
addresses this point: 
In some quarters the future of the book as a vital and indispensable 
form of communication has been seriously questioned.  Other media, 
especially computers in their capacity as ‘information storage and 
retrieval’ devices, are looked upon by some as a future substitute for 
books.  Such dire prophecies are based to a large extent on the false 
idea that books are primarily storehouses of facts and figures and by 
a failure to distinguish between fact and truth, between knowledge 
and wisdom.  These prophecies fail to take into account that books 
also transmit spiritual values and ideas, that there is a special magic 
in the written word of poetry, drama, and fiction, and they ignore the 
beauty of the book as a work of art in itself.  Finally, these prophets of 
doom are indifferent to the physical joys of book reading, of browsing 
at random, and to that kind of informal, spontaneous, and entirely 
voluntary communication between author and reader that the book 
alone makes possible.  Therefore, many thoughtful people who 
recognize the unique value of the serious book to the healthy growth 
of a free and enlightened democracy are united in an effort to 
preserve and to further the dignity and the beauty of the book in the 
modern world.
182
 
Although Lehmann-Haupt wrote this in 1974, his 
prediction that the book is a cultural icon certain not to go 
away seems to have been correct.  Despite recent gains, online 
publishing has been slow to catch on with the general public.183  
Moreover, despite the denial of a preliminary injunction 
against Random House in the case of Random House v. Rosetta 

 181. See Sam Kleinman, Print Books vs. Digital Ebooks, available at 
http://www.palmpower.com/issues/issue200206/ebook0602002.html 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003). 
It’s not likely that ebooks will ever be able to completely and totally 
replace print books, nor should they.  Regardless of future 
developments in e-reading technology, the book market will have 
plenty of room for paper books. . . . [p]rint books will remain as 
collector’s items.  The coffee table book won’t be replaced for quite 
some time, and given that there’s still a rather large market for 
hardback and paperback books, there’s no danger of them 
disappearing anytime soon. Not only are print books holding their 
own against ebooks in market share, but they also have several 
features that ebooks are not able to match. 
Id. 
 182. Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 132, at 231 (emphasis added). 
 183. See Linton Weeks, Ebooks Not Exactly Flying Off the Shelves, WASH. 
POST, July 6, 2002, at C1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A30379-2002Jul5&notFound=true 
(stating that “the plain old reading public—on the beaches, in the coffee shops, 
at the Metro stations—just aren’t buying into e-books”). 
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Books, it seems as though Rosetta as a company has not been 
very successful.184  Furthermore, all indications are that the 
print book publishing industry continues with stellar sales, 
despite these other mediums that seemingly would harm the 
industry.185 
In summary, the medium of books seems to be an exception 
to the general rule that it is impossible to predict which 
existing use will be overtaken by a new use.  There is general 
agreement that the book-publishing industry is in no danger of 
falling apart and that there is relatively no danger of books 
becoming a relic of the past.186  There is simply too much 
beauty, history, and culture to the very existence of books for 
this disappearance to ever occur.187 
C. SO BOOKS ARE DIFFERENT: WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR 
ONLINE PUBLISHING AND COPYRIGHT RIGHTS? 
By accepting that books are different, we are able to make 
a more educated decision as to the effects of policy and 
promoting the arts.  Simply put, all things are not equal.  We 
can be fairly confident, if not certain, that online publishing is 
not going to replace the print book medium.  Therefore, Hardy’s 
concern regarding the error of predicting wrong – i.e., 
predicting that the new use will not replace the existing use, 
and thus not pay royalties – is almost nonexistent.188  Due to 
the extensive history and place in our culture that books hold, 
we can safely assume that online publishing will not lead to 
books becoming defunct. 

 184. See Kathy Sanborn, A Victory for Authors and Readers: An Interview 
with Leo Dwyer, COO of Rosetta Books (July 19, 2001), EBOOK COLUMN AND 
COMMENTARY, available at 
http://www.knowbetter.com/ebook/columns/detail.asp?id=3 (last visited March 
3, 2003)  In response to the question, “How’s Rosetta Books doing?  Is business 
brisk?”, Chief Operating Officer of Rosetta Books, Leo Dwyer, responded “As 
you may suppose, the Random House case required a lot of our attention, so 
we have quite a bit of work to do to catch up.”  Id.  The implication seems to be 
that business has not been great. 
 185. See AAP Annual Report Fiscal Year 2000-2001, at 2, available at 
http://www.publishers.org/about/AAP%20Annual%20Reoprt%202000-2001.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (“Book Sales in 2000 totaled $25.2 billion, according 
to figures released by AAP in February, 2001”). 
 186. See Lehmann-Haupt, supra note 132, at 220-231 
 187. Id.  Admittedly, this assumption is presumptuous.  As this article 
made clear in Part IV, one should foresee the unforeseeable. However, when 
the evidence so strongly supports a prediction, it must be considered. 
 188. See Hardy, supra note 89, at 693. 
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Knowing this fact, Hardy’s argument can be used against 
him.  Hardy theorizes that if we knew that the new use 
industry would not replace the old one, it is best to interpret 
the grant broadly in favor of the licensee.189  Again, this is 
because at a maximum, the ebook industry will serve as an 
advertising mechanism for the old use.190  The advertising will 
result in benefits for the author and may even increase sales.  
Since online publishing, in general, aids print book sales, online 
publishing will serve as an incentive for authors to keep 
producing works, thus promoting the arts. 
At the same time, giving the grant to the publisher 
promotes the progress of science.  If online publishing is 
successful in serving as an advertising mechanism for the 
industry, existing book publishers will have incentive to 
continue developing the existing technology.  Moreover, 
because book publishing is so firmly entrenched and secure, 
there are additional incentives to develop other media 
technologies to host the work and serve as additional 
advertising mechanisms.  Therefore, precisely because we know 
that online publishing poses no realistic threat to the existence 
of print books, policy considerations favor publishers 
maintaining ebook rights. 
This approach also addresses concerns for the author of the 
work raised with the narrow approach.191  As noted above, the 
authors’ interest is still protected by these broad grants of 
rights precisely because books are so firmly entrenched in the 
culture.  Authors will still be receiving the same amount of 
royalties they had come to expect from their publishers because 
the ebook is unlikely to affect the print books sales.  Moreover, 
there is the chance that sales of their book will actually 
increase due to the advertising component of the ebook. 
D. APPLYING THIS THEORY TO RANDOM HOUSE 
Applying the theories above to the facts of Random House 
leads to the conclusion that copyright policy favors Random 
House holding the copyright to the ebook for the eight works in 
question.  Before even applying the theories above, the first 
step is to read the grants of each contract and determine if 
there is ambiguity.  If the court finds no ambiguity in the grant 

 189. See id. at 692-93. 
 190. Id.; see supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Rosen, supra note 107, at 631-32. 
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as it pertains to new uses, it should rule consistent with the 
language.  However, if the court finds ambiguity in the grant, 
the above policies should be considered in the court’s ruling. 
If ambiguity is found, the second step is applying the new 
use theory described above in Part IV, Section A.  The 
development of ebook technology would be considered a new 
use not anticipated at the time of the creation of the contract.192  
Applying the new use copyright theory as determined above,193 
policy would favor allowing each of the individual authors to 
hold the copyright to the ebook.  Since each of these authors 
legally transferred their rights to Rosetta, these transfers 
should be given effect and Rosetta should hold the copyright to 
the ebooks. 
The third and final step is to determine whether or not the 
exception to the general rule in Section A – described in 
Sections B and C of Part IV– apply.  The exception applies only 
when the old use in question is the medium of print books.  The 
Random House case falls squarely within this exception, as the 
original medium for publication of the books in question was 
print.  Therefore, for the reasons described in Sections B and C, 
copyright policy favors Random House holding the copyright to 
the ebooks for the works in question.194 
V. CONCLUSION 
This note began with a detailed history of new use case 
law.  It followed with a look at four academic theories in regard 
to the new use issue, two of which favored a narrow grant of 
rights to the licensee and two of which favored a broad grant of 
rights.  After a brief examination of the history of books, the 
background information was used to show that public policy 
normally favors authors maintaining the new use rights to 
their product; however, the same background information is 
used to show that ebooks and the book publishing industry are 
an exception to this rule. 
The above analysis sets forth two points.  The first point is 
that, in general, the goals of copyright law seem to favor a more 
limited grant of new use rights to the licensee.  Although there 
are arguments for both sides, in cases of ambiguity, public 

 192. All of the contracts were created prior to 1982, well before the 
development of the Internet.  See Random House, 150 F. Supp.2d at 615-16.  
Therefore, the new use of ebooks was clearly unforeseeable. 
 193. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 194. See discussion supra Parts IV.B-C. 
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policy favors authors retaining their new use rights.  The 
second point explains that due to books’ special place in the 
history and culture of our society the new use of online 
publishing should be an exception to the general policy for a 
narrow grant of rights.  In applying these theories to the case of 
Random House v. Rosetta Books and assuming the court were 
to find ambiguity in the grant language, policy considerations 
would favor ruling for Random House and ordering Rosetta 
Books to cease infringement on Random House’s rights. 
